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Abstract 
Purpose – Mergers and acquisitions in the real estate investment trust (REIT) sector have 
been studied in distinct periods and locations, often leading to findings which are relevant 
only for the period and/or location investigated. The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
merger and acquisition studies in aggregate using meta-analysis so that broader findings of 
factors influencing the returns by targets and bidders are divulged. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Using a methodology similar to Veld and Veld-
Merkoulova a sample of 15 REIT studies with 35 observations for bidders and 25 
observations for targets is analysed. A variety of potential factors influencing the returns for 
bidders and targets are explored. 
 
Findings – Consistent with prior non-REIT research, the evidence shows targets enjoy 
positive and significant gains in a merger. There is also evidence that acquirers earn 
significant wealth when all previous studies are examined in aggregate. Meta-analysis results 
show targets experience higher wealth gains by accepting cash financed deals, but share total 
gains when both parties are REITs. Additionally, acquirers enjoy improved abnormal returns 
when the target is privately listed and the use of scrip and/or a combination of scrip and cash 
produces higher wealth gains for bidding REITs. 
 
Originality/value – This paper aggregates the merger and acquisition literature of REITs to 
understand better factors influencing returns made by bidders and targets. 
Introduction 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) identify the merger and acquisition market, or market for 
corporate control, “as a market in which alternative managerial teams compete for the rights 
to manage corporate resources” (p. 6) and it is this competition that may limit managerial 
departures from the maximisation of the owners (shareholders) wealth objective. Manne's 
(1965) seminal paper on the market for corporate control identifies that M&As provide some 
guarantee of effective competition between managers and thus provides strong protection to 
the interests of non-controlling shareholders. 
Studies into the wealth creation of M&As within the REIT sector have attracted attention in 
the academic research area. Studies of the US market have found that shareholders of target 
firms earn significant positive excess returns around the announcement day, ranging from 
10.86 percent (Eichholtz and Kok, 2008) to 1.48 percent (McIntosh et al., 1989). However, 
research on the excess returns to bidding shareholders has demonstrated a contraction in 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Early studies by Allen and Sirmans (1987) reported 
significant positive excess returns of 5.78 percent around the announcement day, while more 
recent studies have reported significant negative CARs of 1.21 percent (Sahin, 2005). 
The purpose of this study is to employ a meta-analysis approach to investigate the empirical 
literature and identify the impact of various factors on the excess returns in M&As for both 
targets and acquirers. Stanley (2001) describes meta-analysis as a body of statistical methods 
for evaluating and reviewing empirical research results. When independent studies have been 
performed on a specific subject that utilises different methods and data sets, then employing 
meta-analysis to combine: 
[…] their results can furnish more insight and greater explanatory power than the mere 
listing of the individual results […] Such studies can also suggest potentially fruitful lines 
for future inquiry and offer a prediction of the results that such new research will find 
(Stanley, 2001, pp. 131-2). 
Glass (2000) notes that 25 percent of articles published in the Psychological Bulletin have 
“meta-analysis” in the title. Meta-analysis has been extensively employed in the social 
sciences areas such as organisational theory, marketing, strategic management, economics, 
finance (Datta et al., 1992) accounting and auditing (Hay, 2010). Hunt (1997) describes 
meta-analysis as how science takes stock, by its very nature quantitative methodology is 
systematic and explicit, hence “its results can be independently evaluated and replicated in a 
manner not possible with traditional literature reviews” (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989, p. 167).  
Results from the multivariate meta-analysis regression model suggest target REITs enjoy 
higher wealth creation when cash is used to finance the acquisition, but total gains are shared 
between both parties in a REIT-REIT transaction. Acquiring REITs experience improved 
wealth effects when the target is privately listed and the use of scrip and/or combination of 
cash and scrip as mode of payment produces bidding shareholder wealth. 
The other reason this study could prove interesting is as follows, Andrade et al. (2001) 
identify two main catalysts for M&A activity featured in the literature; first, mergers occur in 
waves and second, within each wave, there is a strong clustering by industry. This suggests 
that unexpected shocks to an industry's structure may result in an increase in merger activity. 
These shocks lead to a restructuring by industries as a reaction, often via merger or takeover. 
The impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on the market values of the global listed real 
estate sector, namely the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) sector, could well be 
considered an industrial shock. According to the National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (NAREIT) the market capitalisation of the US REIT sector fell from a high 
of US$445 billion in February 2007 to a low of US$129 billion in March 2009, a fall of over 
70 percent. This industry shock may pave way for a wave of M&As in the future as the 
global property sector recovers (Klijn, 2009). A number of authors have highlighted the 
possibility of increased merger activity in the near future. Psaltis and Chubb (2008) note that 
if underlying property market fundamentals can be sustained, vulnerable REITs offer good 
value for money, however, many acquires “are being held back by lack of finance and 
nervousness around market volatility, covenants and ‘poison pills’” (p. 7). Carroll and Torto 
(2009) posit that “well capitalised REITs likely to acquire weaker REITs, single assets, and 
portfolios at very attractive pricing levels post-credit crisis” (p. 19). Finally, Combs (2009) 
notes that the: 
[…] merger and acquisition activity, which was synonymous with the industry's boom, may 
play a key role in its recovery. This time around, the deals aren't based on high property 
valuations and easily available capital, but rather depressed prices (p. 104). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a theoretical 
overview of wealth creation in M&As, we then discuss the seven key factors which we 
hypothesise to influence excess returns. The following section discusses the sample employed 
in our study and the method employed to investigate the various factors. Third, we present 
the results of the meta-analysis regression model, and finally we provide concluding 
discussions on the results and their implications for practitioners. 
Theoretical overview 
The first paper published in this area was in 1987 by Allen and Sirmans. Since then we have 
identified 13 other major journal papers. Table I, panel A shows the journals in which the 
studies were published and panel B reports some data relating to the number of years in the 
study periods and the number of observations in the samples. The Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics has published five of the 15 papers, with the Journal of Real Estate 
Research and Real Estate Economics both publishing two. The remaining papers have been 
spread across other real estate journals. It can be seen that the mean number of years in a 
study period is 9.133 years, with a minimum period of two years and a maximum period of 
24 years. The number of observations utilised varies from a maximum of 228 to a minimum 
of 18, with a mean observation number of 77.6. 
Measuring wealth creation 
Allen and Sirmans (1987) conducted the first study into the wealth effects of REIT takeovers 
by investigating 38 successful REIT-REIT mergers from 1977 to 1983. The study found that 
REIT bidders experienced significant positive CARs of+5.78 percent over the [−1,0] event 
window. This result is in contrast to studies for non-REIT takeovers, for example, Andrade et 
al. (2001) find small negative CARs for targets over the event window [−1,+1] of −0.37 
percent whilst investigating a similar study period of 1973-1989, however, the results 
displayed no statistical significance. Morck et al. (1990) provides similar results over the 
study period of 1975-1987 with non-significant CARs of −0.70 percent around the period 
[−2,+1]. 
Extending on the research of Allen and Sirmans (1987), McIntosh et al. (1989) examined the 
returns for 27 target REIT shareholders over the period of 1962-1986. Results showed a 
positive and significant mean abnormal return for target unit holders of +2.16 percent over 
the event window [−1,0]. The authors concluded that the results are “consistent with the 
hypothesis that target REIT shareholders experience a positive wealth effect due to the 
merger announcement” (McIntosh et al., 1989, p. 145). 
Campbell et al. (1998) examined 27 completed equity REIT (EREIT) mergers from 1990 to 
1998, the study reported a negative CAR of −1.1 percent over the [−1,+1] period for bidding 
firms. Target EREITs produced CARs of +5.2 percent over the event window [−1,+1], when 
compared to non-REIT studies, the authors noted that these results “as a group fit in among 
the worst results found in the non-REIT corporate world” (p. 49)[1]. In a later study of 40 
public-to-public REIT M&As, Campbell et al. (2001) demonstrated targets earned positive 
and significant CARs of +3.2 percent over the event period [−1,+1] and acquirers 
experienced negative and significant excess returns of −0.6 percent. In a study of 53 public-
private M&As, Campbell et al. (2005) found evidence of positive significant excess returns 
for bidding firms of +1.52 percent over the three day event window. 
Sahin (2005) investigated 35 M&As over the period 1990-1998 and found positive and 
significant gains to target REITs of +4.31 percent over the event window [−1,+1]. This result 
indicates lower target excess returns around the announcement period than those reported by 
McIntosh et al. (1989) [2]. However, consistent with Campbell et al. (1998, 2001) acquiring 
firms experienced significant negative excess returns of −1.21 percent over the three day 
window. 
An investigation of 95 international[3] M&As of listed property companies from 1999 to 
2004 was conducted by Eichholtz and Kok (2008) to determine the effectiveness of the 
market for corporate control in the real estate sector and find that the inefficient management 
hypothesis holds for both REITs and non-REITs. The inefficient management hypothesis 
suggests that M&A activity is motivated by the desire to enhance the performance of targets' 
by replacing underperforming management, resulting positive excess returns to both targets 
and acquirers (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003). The study found excess returns for targets and 
acquirers were distinctly different for the real estate sector. Target firms experienced a 
positive and significant CAR of +8.66 percent over the event period [−1,+1]. However, the 
authors note this lower CAR compared to more general corporate finance studies may be due 
to the homogeneity of the assets of property companies, resulting in a lower potential for 
synergistic profits. The excess returns to acquirers produced a small, but positive CAR over 
the three day event window. Although the results lacked statistical significance, they do 
support previous findings in real estate literature that bidding firms experience better excess 
returns in M&As compared to general corporate finance literature. 
Keisers (2009) investigated 93 international REIT-REIT M&As from 1990 to 2005. Excess 
returns for targets are consistent with previous research, earning significant CARs of +4.95 
percent over the three day event window. Acquiring REITs earned insignificant CARs of 
−0.41 percent, when the sample was divided into public and private targets, results showed 
public-public M&As CARs of negative 0.76 percent and significant, consistent with 
Campbell et al. (2009). Public-private REIT transactions returned a positive CAR of 0.66 
percent, but the value was insignificant. Keisers (2009) concluded bidding REITs earn higher 
excess returns when the target was private. 
In a study of 36 Australian REIT-REIT M&As, Ratcliffe et al. (2009), found both targets and 
acquirers earn positive and significant CARs over the [−1,+1] event period (+4.28 and +0.86 
percent, respectively). The authors suggest that this result “may be driven by the recognition 
that size, asset growth and diversification are avenues to improved returns and attract capital” 
(p. 294) in the Australian REIT market. When the study investigated the impact of method of 
payment they found that acquiring REITs earn positive and significant excess returns of 
+1.55 percent when the transaction is financed by scrip and/or a combination of scrip and 
cash and suggest that target REIT shareholders identify the synergistic benefits of the merger 
but value the fact the acquiring firm is able to preserve cash by financing the merger with 
scrip or combination. 
Ooi et al. (2011) investigated 228 property acquisition announcements in the Japanese and 
Singaporean REIT markets from 2002 to 2007. The authors suggested the aggressive growth 
by acquisition by the Asian REITs is a result of improved economies of scale and better 
management practices. Results showed bidding REITs earn positive and significant abnormal 
returns of +0.21 percent in the three-day window around announcement. Finally, Ling and 
Petrova (2011) investigated the wealth effects of public-public and public-private REIT 
M&A announcements from 1994 to 2007 and found consistent with Eichholtz and Kok 
(2008), targets in public-private M&As earn higher excess returns than targets involved in 
public-public announcements. Results showed CARs over the three day event window for 
public-private deals of +10.38 percent compared to +7.70 percent for public-public. 
The evidence shows, consistent with prior more general corporate finance literature, that the 
majority of the gains in a M&A are enjoyed by target firms. However, the level of CARs is 
considerably lower than those observed in non-REIT studies, possibly due to the 
homogeneity of the assets (Eichholtz and Kok, 2008; Campbell, 2002). The evidence on the 
impact of acquiring shareholders is somewhat mixed. Early studies show large excess returns 
to bidding shareholders, but it appears from later studies that the opportunity for bidding 
firms to obtain large excess returns has decreased. 
Hostile v. friendly 
It is interesting to note the lack of hostile takeovers in the published research. Allen and 
Sirmans (1987) identify only one hostile offer, Campbell et al. (1998, 2001) note a complete 
absence of hostile takeovers, or even unsolicited tender offers. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) 
identify only two hostile attempts in their sample of 95 international property company 
transactions. Campbell et al. (2001, 2005) argue that the special regulatory conditions 
imposed on REITs with respect to asset structure, ownership configuration and dividend 
distribution make hostile takeover attempts against REITs difficult. Further to this argument, 
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) note that the transparency of the REIT structure, “which is so 
beneficial to corporate governance that it makes the market for corporate control less 
important as a governance mechanism” (p. 159). It would seem that the lack of hostile 
takeovers may be a driving influence on the lower levels of excess returns reported for REITs 
when compared to more general corporate finance studies. 
Factors influencing wealth creation 
This section discusses the variables that have been used in previous REIT M&A studies. The 
meta-analysis approach will also use these variables. 
1986 Tax Reform Act 
Prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, REITs were not permitted to be self-managed entities and 
were passive, static investment vehicles offering shareholders advantages of liquidity and 
portfolio diversification within the property sector (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). Campbell 
(2002) notes, since then REITs have become more dynamic, self-managed entities and are 
“much more similar to the rest of the corporate world” (p. 212) and suggests that the 1986 
Tax Reform Act is a driver for the observed difference in excess returns reported for 
acquirers by Allen and Sirmans (1987) of +5.78 percent and those observed in more recent 
studies[4]. To control for this factor, a Pre-1986 variable is included for studies with a 
sample period ending 1986 or earlier[5]. 
Method of payment – cash v. scrip/combination 
When bidding companies enter into M&A transactions, they have a choice of how to finance 
the acquisition; cash, stock or a combination. Research has documented that the choice of 
payment has an impact on excess returns, both bidder and target excess returns are higher 
when cash is used as the method of payment (Wansley et al., 1983; Travlos, 1987; Davidson 
and Cheng, 1997; Andrade et al., 2001). 
In the study of REIT takeovers and method of payment, the results show that targets enjoy 
positive and significant CARs regardless of what payment method is used, however, CARs 
are higher when cash is used to finance the acquisition. The mean CARs for targets in cash 
financed M&As is +10.53 percent, while scrip and/or combination acquisitions returned a 
mean CAR of +6.29 percent. However, the CARs for bidding firms appear to be distinctly 
different for the REIT sector. The mean CARs for cash transactions were +0.52 percent, 
lower than the mean for scrip and/or combination deals of +0.98 percent. Further 
investigation shows a range of −0.6 percent (Campbell et al., 2001) to a high of +2.32 percent 
(Taylor and Paolone, 1997) for Scrip/Combination financed acquisitions, this result is higher 
than those observed in stock-financed general corporate finance studies[6]. 
Campbell et al. (2001) suggest that this result is due to the unique structure of REITs, more 
specifically their requirement to payout 95 percent of their earnings, limits the opportunity to 
finance acquisitions with internally generated funds. This may lessen the negative 
implications of using stock as the method of payment. To control for these factors we employ 
a variable for cash financed M&As (Cash) and for scrip and/or combination transactions 
(Scrip/Combo). 
REIT-REIT v. Non-REIT-REIT 
The results for acquirer CARs in REIT-REIT M&As displayed a larger increase in wealth, 
compared to the non-REIT acquirer group. The mean excess return REIT-REIT mergers was 
+0.849 percent, whereas the non-REIT group produce a mean excess return of +0.453 
percent. However, REIT-REIT mergers had a greater range of results, ranging from a low of 
−1.21 percent (Sahin, 2005) to a high of +5.78 percent (Allen and Sirmans, 1987)[7]. The 
differences in the results may “reflect the desire of investors to retain a ‘pure’ real estate 
play” (McIntosh et al., 1989, p. 154). 
The tend is reversed when we study the target excess returns, the mean for REIT-REIT 
mergers is +5.266 percent compared to the non-REIT mean of +6.595 percent[8]. The range 
of CARs for both groups was similar, REIT-REIT mergers ranged from +3.20 percent 
(Campbell et al., 2001) to +10.43 percent (Allen and Sirmans, 1987). Non-REIT results 
ranged from +1.48 percent (McIntosh et al., 1989) to +10.15 percent (Eichholtz and Kok, 
2008). We hypothesise that the difference in means is due to the high level of transparency in 
REIT structures, which enables the market to price REITs more efficiently than their non-
REIT counterparts. To model for these factors we employ the variable REIT-REIT for 
mergers when both parties are REITs. The variable Non-REIT is used for M&As when at 
least one of the entities is a non-REIT. 
Public-public v. public-private 
General corporate finance studies have identified a sharp contrast in acquirer excess returns 
for public-public and public-private mergers, for example, Fuller et al. (2002) find that 
acquirers earn positive and significant CARs of +2.08 percent for public-private acquisitions, 
public-public M&As return a negative and significant excess return of −1.00 percent. Moeller 
et al. (2004) displays similar results, with a significant CAR of +1.49 percent public-private, 
compared to significant negative CARs of −1.02 percent for public-public mergers. Chang 
(1998) suggests that these results are due to the monitoring activities of target shareholders 
and reduced information asymmetries. In the case of REITs this trend is continued, Campbell 
et al. (2009) finds positive and significant excess return for public-private mergers of +1.1 
percent, compared to negative and significant CARs of −0.95 percent for public-public 
mergers[9]. To model for these factors we employ the variable Public-Public for mergers 
when both parties are listed entities. The variable Public-Private is used for M&As when one 
of the entities is not listed. 
Method 
Sample 
The sample for our study consists of research journals that have empirically examined M&A 
announcements involving REITs and the impact on shareholder wealth using event study 
methodologies. Table II provides a break-down of the studies that make up the sample, along 
with the study period, number of observations in each study, the factors identified, the CAR 
results for each factor and event window for which the results were reported. Our analysis 
consists of thirteen published studies with a total of 35 useable observations for bidders and 
25 observations for targets. Although multiple observations from the one study have been 
included in our sample, the CARs from these samples are unrelated to each other[10]. For 
example, Campbell et al. (2001) provides CARs for acquirers involved in public-public 
M&As, along with CARs for public-private transactions. The study also identifies CARs for 
M&As financed with cash and those financed with scrip and/or a combination, resulting in a 
total of four usable and independent observations. 
Model 
In this investigation we employ a meta-analysis procedure to assess the impact and 
significance of the factors described in the previous section on the excess returns resulting 
from M&A announcements. We follow the methodology described by Datta et al. (1992) and 
Veld and Veld-Merkoulova (2009) who studied M&A and spin-off excess returns, 
respectively. The estimated CARs from M&A announcements from prior studies are used as 
the dependant variable in the multivariate regression model, the explanatory factors are those 
that are hypothesised to influence the excess returns. The following multivariate regression 
model is employed using the previously described factors as dummy variables (of 1 and 0) 
and the reported CARs as the dependant variable: Equation 1 where: 
CAR t cumulative abnormal return for event period t. 
Pre-1986 any study utilising data period prior to the introduction of the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
(Yes=1). 
Cash any study that provides results for excess returns when cash is used as the mode of 
payment (Yes=1). 
Scrip/Combo any study that provides results for excess returns when scrip and/or a 
combination of scrip and cash is used as the mode of payment (Yes=1). 
REIT-REIT studies that list results for CARs when the M&A is REIT-REIT (Yes =1). 
Non-REIT any study that provides CAR results when at least one of the entities is a non-REIT 
(Yes=1). 
Public-Public studies that include results for M&As when both entities are listed (Yes =1). 
Public-Private studies that include results for M&As when one party is a private entity (Yes 
=1). 
This procedure permits us to investigate and test the significance of each independent 
variable after controlling for the effects of other variables. Standard diagnostic tests are also 
run to examine for normality, hetroskedasticity and omitted variables. 
Results 
Table III provides the mean and median CARs for both targets and bidders involved in M&A 
announcements with cross-sectional t-statistics and Wilcoxon tests. Panel A contains all 
observations from the sample. Targets show significant mean CARs of 6.558 percent while 
the median is 5.290 percent and is also significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
Bidders return a mean CAR of 0.719 percent and a median of 0.370 percent, both values are 
statistically significant. This result shows that, on average, acquirers also earn significantly 
positive excess returns in M&A announcements. To further investigate this outcome, we 
excluded the pre-1986 studies[11] and found the results remained significant. Target mean 
CARs increased to 7.240 percent and the standard deviation fell from 3.057 percent in panel 
A to 2.739 percent in panel B. Bidding firms mean CARs fell slightly to 0.586 percent, but 
remained significant, while the standard deviation also fell from 1.319 to 1.025 percent in 
panel B. This result further strengthens the finding that acquiring firms earn positive and 
significant excess returns. 
The results from the multivariate regression model are displayed in Table IV, panel A show 
the results for acquirers. Model 1 shows that when acquiring firms utilise scrip and or a 
combination as the method of payment it has a positive and significant impact on excess 
returns. Second we find that the 1986 Tax Reform Act had a positive and significant impact 
on bidding firms excess returns, this result confirms Campbell (2002) claim that the higher 
excess returns observed in pre-1986 studies are a result of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, since 
then REITs have become more dynamic, self-managed entities and similar to the rest of the 
corporate world. We conclude that studies pre-1986 are a separate result in themselves and 
thus should be considered independently to more recent studies. 
Furthermore, to control for this influence, we removed pre-1986 studies (and the dependant 
variable) from the sample, the results are shown in Model 2. Results show that the 
Scrip/Combo factor continues to have a positive and significant influence on bidders CARs, 
this result confirms claims by Campbell et al. (2001) that the limitation of internally 
generated funds due to the organisational structure of REITs decreases the negative 
implications of using stock as the method of payment and therefore highlights that REITs are 
distinctly different in M&A outcomes when compared to more general corporate finance 
studies. 
Model 2 shows that the Public-Public factor has a negative and significant impact on bidders 
excess returns. This result is consistent with general corporate finance studies that show 
bidding firms earn lower excess returns in public-public acquisitions. When we look at the 
Public-Public and the Public-Private factors combined (positive coefficient, although not 
significant) our results display even more consistency with non-REIT studies[12]. 
Furthermore, this result provides strong support for the Chang (1998) conclusion, that the 
results are due to the monitoring activities of target shareholders in public-private M&As and 
reduce information asymmetries. We conclude from these results that REITs react similarly 
to non-REITs when the M&A is either public-public or public-private. 
Finally, we find both the REIT-REIT and Non-REIT variables to be negative and significant. 
This result confirms that targets enjoy the majority of the gains in a M&A announcement. 
However, when we conducted a Pearson correlation matrix to identify any correlations 
between our explanatory variables the matrix showed that the REIT-REIT and Non-REIT 
factors displayed a high level of correlation[13]. To accommodate for this we ran another two 
models deleting one of the variables at a time. The results from models 3 and 4 showed that 
once the high correlation was accounted for the significance of the REIT-REIT and Non-REIT 
variable disappears. Models 3 and 4 also provide further support our findings that scrip 
and/or combination financed M&As have a positive and significant influence on bidders 
excess returns and public-public M&As have a negative influence. 
Panel B of Table IV shows the results for targets in the regression model[14]. Model 5 shows 
that pre-1986 M&As have a negative impact on target returns, this result further supports our 
conclusion that pre-1986 studies are a separate result in themselves, however, the significance 
is only at the 10 percent level. We also find that cash has a positive and slightly significant 
impact of target excess returns. When we removed early studies from the sample (model 6) 
we find the Non-REIT factor is positive and significant which suggests that targets enjoy 
higher wealth creation when one entity is not a REIT. When we adjust the model for the high 
correlation of the REIT-REIT and Non-REIT factors, we find that REIT-REIT mergers have a 
negative and significant impact on targets wealth creation (model 7); however, the cash factor 
is no longer significant. In model 8 the cash factor is again significant and positive, this 
provides support for the signalling theory, that cash financed M&As create higher wealth for 
targets than scrip and/or combination financed acquisitions. Finally, the Non-REIT factor in 
model 8 is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This result further supports the 
findings in model 6. 
We conclude that the positive coefficient the Non-REIT factor is a result of the high level of 
transparency of REITs compared to non-REITs; this reduces the asymmetric information 
between REITs and shareholders resulting in the market being able to price REITs more 
accurately than non-REITs. Furthermore, the negative coefficient for the REIT-REIT factor 
suggests that the total excess returns resulting from a M&A announcement are shared 
between both targets and bidders. 
Conclusion 
We employ a multivariate meta-analysis framework to analyse the empirical literature 
concerning the influence of various factors on shareholder wealth in M&As within the REIT 
sector. The GFC has had a profound impact on real estate worldwide, especially the REIT 
sector. A number of industry analysts have pointed towards a possible merger wave as the 
sector recovers. The aim of this paper is to provide insights into the market for corporate 
control in the REIT sector. Evidence shows, consistent with prior non-REIT research, targets 
enjoy the majority of the gains in a merger. However, CARs are lower that those presented in 
general corporate finance studies, possibly due to the homogeneity of the assets (Eichholtz 
and Kok, 2008; Campbell, 2002) and/or the lack of hostile takeovers witnessed in the sector. 
We also provide evidence that bidders also earn significant mean excess returns when all the 
previous studies are examined together. 
Meta-analysis results reveal that REITs have undergone a structural change post the 1986 
Tax Reform Act. The signalling impacts of using scrip and/or combination as method of 
payment is negated for acquiring REITs. This result suggests that REITs are distinctly 
different to the corporate world due to their restrictive structure. We also find that the market 
reacts similarly to bidding REIT announcements when the target is either public or private 
when compared to more general corporate finance studies. For targets, when one party in the 
transaction is a non-REIT, targets experience higher excess returns, compared to a negative 
influence when both entities are REITs. We suggest that the high level of transparency in 
REITs is the driving force for this result. 
What do our results imply for practitioners? First, target REIT managers have experienced 
increased wealth gains by accepting deals financed by cash, but also that the total excess 
gains in a M&A are been shared between both parties in a REIT-REIT transaction. Bidding 
managers need to be aware that public targets have a negative wealth effect for their 
shareholders, while private targets have generally provided positive returns. Finally, the use 
of scrip and/or combination as mode of payment produced shareholder wealth for bidding 
REITs. 
 
Equation 1 
 
Table IJournals that have published articles relating to M&As in REITs 
 
Table IIStudies of the wealth creation effects associated with M&A announcements 
 
Table IIIMean and median CARs around M&A announcements 
 
Table IVMultivariate meta-analysis regression results of factors influencing wealth creation 
in REIT M&As 
Notes 
1. For example, Andrade et al. (2001), using the 
same study period of 1990-1998, showed non-
REIT targets enjoy significant positive CARs 
of +23.3 percent over the event window 
[−1,+1]. 
2. The CAR for target REITs in successful M&A 
was 6.88 percent over the event window 
[−1,+1]. 
3. Countries included: USA, Canada, UK, 
Australia, Sweden and The Netherlands. 
4. For example, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) report 
CARs of +0.37 percent for bidders and 
Campbell et al. (2009) report 0.00 percent 
bidder CARs. 
5. A post-1993 variable was also introduced into 
the model to investigate the impact of the REIT 
boom and the introduction of the UPREIT 
structure on the observed excess returns. The 
variable had no major statistical impact on the 
results. 
6. For example: Chang (1998) reports −2.5 
percent and Andrade et al. (2001) reports −1.5 
percent over the similar event windows. 
7. Both studies reported the values to be 
statistically significant. 
8. The majority of results in REIT-REIT and non-
REIT studies returned significant CARs for 
targets. 
9. This result is consistent with Campbell et al. 
(2001, 2005). 
10. See, Datta et al. (1992) for further discussion 
on useable observations. 
11. Pre-1986 studies were removed to test if the 
results of significance were being driven by 
early studies, Campbell (2002) notes that the 
1986 Tax Reform Act may be a driver for the 
higher levels of excess returns observed in 
early studies. 
12. For example, see, Moeller et al. (2004) and 
Fuller et al. (2002). 
13. Correlation matrix outcomes are available from 
the author upon request. 
14. Targets model excluded public-private and 
public-public factors due to only two deals 
involving a privately listed entity, the 
remaining samples were public-public. To test 
the influence, models were run with the Public-
Private factor; however the factor had no 
impact on our results. 
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